What’s new? Fighting is spreading in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite signing peace deals in Washington and Doha, the Congolese army, M23 rebels and Rwandan troops continue to trade fire, with the insurgents and invading soldiers taking more territory as 2025 draws to a close.

Why does it matter? The fighting, under way since the M23 re-emerged in 2021, has forced millions from their homes and killed tens of thousands of civilians. It has also strained relations among Great Lakes neighbours, with Rwanda and Burundi at loggerheads since the latter piled in to support the weak Congolese army.

What should be done? Diplomats with influence over the warring parties should push urgently for a sustained ceasefire and engage in back-channel talks to head off an even worse crisis. In the longer run, Great Lakes countries must respect the region’s borders and stop using armed groups to settle their quarrels.

Executive Summary
In January, the M23 insurgency and Rwandan troops took over the city of Goma in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), home to one of the world’s biggest UN operations and host to a multitude of fighters backing the Congolese government. They proceeded to advance in the North and South Kivu provinces, cranking up tensions across the Great Lakes region. Diplomatic efforts to restore peace quickened in response. The Rwandan and Congolese governments initialled an accord in Washington in June and then signed a full agreement at a presidential summit in December, in which they restated their pledge to end the fighting. Parallel talks between the Congolese government and M23 under Qatari mediation also gave birth to a framework deal in November. But as both sides recruit and re-arm, and violence spreads, an alarming disconnect has emerged between peace talks and events on the ground. Western, Gulf and African diplomats need to redouble efforts to achieve a ceasefire, head off regional escalation and persuade Kinshasa and Kigali to pull back their allied militias.

The M23 – named after an agreement signed between a previous insurgency and Kinshasa on 23 March 2009 – is the latest avatar of foreign-backed Tutsi armed groups which, while purporting to support their downtrodden Tutsi brethren, have wreaked havoc throughout the eastern DRC for three decades. The M23 and its political wing, the Congo River Alliance (or AFC, by the French acronym), control the largest area a rebel group has held since the civil and regional wars of the 1990s and early 2000s, with disastrous consequences for humanitarian relief efforts, which are now near the breaking point. The rebellion’s ambitions seem diverse. While its military wing has focused on capturing territory under the banner of protecting Tutsis, its political leaders say they aim to topple the government in Kinshasa. The objectives of their sponsors in Rwanda are even less transparent. Even so, Kigali and its Congolese proxies seem determined to take full advantage of their military strength and are bedding down for a long-term occupation.

The insurgency has expanded at a delicate time in Congolese politics. Relations between the government, on one side, and opposition, civil society and influential church bodies are tense following President Félix Tshisekedi’s 2024 announcement of plans to change the constitution, which observers fear could enable him to seek a third term in office. The prospect of a controversial amendment is eating away at chances of achieving any sort of cross-party agreement as to how to deal with the M23. All these problems have been exacerbated by the conflict in the east, as a number of opposition politicians align with some of the AFC’s demands, while stopping short of outright support. The government has reacted by accusing them of sedition. A further blow to hopes of consensus on handling the crisis came in September, when a military court sentenced former President Joseph Kabila to death in absentia for insurrection, accusing him of backing the M23.

Mediators’ efforts to resolve the conflict have been complicated by the imbalance of power between a shambolic Congolese army and ill-coordinated allies, on one side, and a well-equipped insurgency and robust Rwandan army, on the other. Under the mandate of the African Union (AU), Angola attempted to bridge the gap between Kigali and Kinshasa, but its diplomatic push faltered at the end of 2024 and Luanda withdrew from mediating the following March.

Rwanda and the DRC have held fast to their respective positions. Kigali has argued that the violence in the DRC was Congolese rather than international in origin, saying it impinged on Rwanda only in so far as it threatened the country’s security. It has consistently denied any active role in supporting the M23 despite growing evidence to the contrary. It has also stressed in public and in negotiations Kinshasa’s collaboration with a remnant of the Rwandan Hutu militia responsible for the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Democratic Liberation Front (FDLR, by the French acronym), in an attempt to boost its argument that its deployment is defensive. But Rwanda’s deployment of thousands of troops in the DRC seems to have the wider aim of conquering territory beyond areas under FDLR influence. For its part, the Congolese government has refused to fully cut ties to this militia and the Wazalendo, a loose alliance of self-defence groups responsible for numerous abuses.

Since the fall of Goma, fresh talks have got under way, but they face similar problems. Washington brokered a deal in June under which Congolese and Rwandan ministers agreed to cooperate, and it hosted the Rwandan and Congolese presidents on 4 December for a signing ceremony. Qatar, crucially, engineered a heads-of-state summit between the Congolese and Rwandan leaders in March that contributed to largely halting an M23/Rwanda offensive deeper into Congolese territory outside the Kivus. Doha is now hosting talks between the Congolese government and the AFC/M23 rebels. Kinshasa had previously refused to engage with the rebels, arguing that the group was a Rwandan puppet. The two parties signed a ceasefire in October, and a framework agreement in November, though fighting continues on the ground. In March, as Angola bowed out, the AU designated President Faure Gnassingbé of Togo as mediator alongside a team of five senior facilitators, tasking them with shouldering more of the diplomatic burden if and when Kinshasa and the rebels comply with a permanent ceasefire, which remains an important objective of the Doha framework agreement.

A priority for diplomats in Washington, Doha and African capitals is to work out a path for future mediation.
A priority for diplomats in Washington, Doha and African capitals is to work out a path for future mediation. If Washington relinquishes the lead, African powers may need to take up the baton on the Rwanda-DRC track. For that to happen, their diplomats need to sustain pressure on the parties and start to flesh out terms that will satisfy Rwanda while respecting the DRC’s territorial integrity. Washington and Doha need to stay engaged to insist that the belligerents adhere to the terms of the deal and declarations they have overseen, especially as concerns an immediate, unconditional ceasefire.

The road to a settlement will not be simple or direct. First, all parties to the conflict should work toward a permanent ceasefire. Heading off further escalation, both in the DRC and the region, is equally important. Relations between Rwanda and Burundi have soured due to Burundi’s continued support for Congolese troops, and high-level shuttle diplomacy is needed to work out a modus vivendi between the two rivals. Diplomats need to pressure Kigali and the M23 to allow full humanitarian access to the eastern DRC. Finally, though the conflict may seem intractable, Western, Qatari and African diplomats and mediators should not lose sight of the overarching goal of restoring the DRC’s territorial integrity through the withdrawal of Rwandan forces, as called for in UN Security Resolution 2773 of February, and restarting regional cooperation focused on limiting the suffering inflicted by armed groups.

Rwandan and M23 actions, and the clumsy Congolese government response, have exposed the fragility of Great Lakes regional politics and brought great harm to many. Restoring a semblance of peace, while keeping longer-term aims of regional cooperation and disarmament of armed groups in mind, will occupy diplomats for some time to come.

Nairobi/Brussels, 19 December 2025


Locations of gold (yellow) and other (grey) artisanal mining in the eastern DRC and the M23’s area of operations as of 12 December 2025. Sources: International Peace Information Service; Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute; CRISIS GROUP
I.
Introduction
After being dormant for years, the M23 rebellion re-emerged in 2021 to mount an offensive that has gradually allowed it to capture swathes of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including cities, roads and mines. Led mainly by ethnic Tutsi fighters, the movement has put forward demands focused on the protection of Tutsi civilians and combatants. An earlier iteration of the rebellion briefly took over Goma, capital of North Kivu province, in 2012, demanding that the government fulfil a promise to integrate demobilised insurgents into the national army. Key figures in that movement – including military chief Sultani Makenga, who uses the title of general, and political leader Bertrand Bisimwa – serve as senior commanders today.1

As in 2012, the M23 gained ground largely due to Rwanda’s support. For years, the DRC’s neighbours, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, which seek to exert influence in the area, have used militias in the country’s east as proxies. This time around, Rwanda bolstered the rebellion by supplying weaponry, technology, equipment and training, while stationing thousands of troops in the eastern DRC. Over the course of four years, this assistance enabled the rebellion to display unexpected military prowess, defeating the poorly equipped and ill-disciplined Congolese army and its allies at almost every turn. In 2023, the M23 added a political wing, the Congo River Alliance (AFC in French), which calls for regime change in Kinshasa.2 In the course of 2025, the group has established a parallel administration in the areas it controls in North and South Kivu, running local and provincial councils and a reconstituted police force. All evidence suggests that the insurgents intend to stay.

Diplomatic efforts have failed to achieve a lasting ceasefire.
Diplomatic efforts have failed to achieve a lasting ceasefire. Rwanda has long denied backing the M23, claiming its troop deployment in the DRC is one of the “defensive measures” it has taken against anti-Kigali rebels. For his part, President Félix Tshisekedi refused to talk to the M23, arguing that his country has been invaded by Rwanda. Under the aegis of the African Union (AU), mediation efforts by Angolan President João Lourenço from 2022 were thwarted by the bad faith of the conflict parties, who were determined to keep on fighting.3 In December 2024, Angola’s efforts ground to a halt when Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame failed to attend a meeting in Luanda that was supposed to seal a peace agreement.

The Congolese government remained steadfast in its opposition to dialogue with the M23 until early 2025, when the M23 captured the cities of Goma and Bukavu. Confronted with the loss of these cities, and with the Congolese army on the back foot, Tshisekedi softened his stance and agreed to hold talks under Qatari facilitation. In a separate diplomatic track, on 27 June the Rwandan and Congolese foreign ministers initialled a peace agreement in Washington, following up with a presidential summit on 4 December where the accord was signed by the heads of state. But the Washington process reserved the question of what to do about the M23 rebellion for the Doha talks. These negotiations in turn produced a framework agreement on 14 November, but one that left most of the main issues for later discussion as fighting resumed on the ground.

This report analyses the M23’s resurgence and its expansion in the eastern DRC, as well as the evolution of regional and international diplomacy toward the conflict. It highlights the importance of achieving a workable ceasefire and the need for longer-term diplomacy to head off further conflagration. It is based on around one hundred interviews with Rwandan and Congolese officials, AFC/M23 representatives, diplomats, researchers, experts, eyewitnesses, humanitarian workers, civil society representatives and survivors of the fighting, including traditional chiefs and members of women’s organisations. Interviews were conducted in Goma, Kinshasa and Bukavu, as well as in various regional and Western capitals and by telephone. Around one quarter of interviewees were women, mainly reflecting the gender balance among Congolese administrators and officials working on the file in African capitals.

II.
Who are the M23 Rebels?
A.
The M23: The Latest Incarnation of Tutsi Rebel Movements
The Tutsi community has been at the centre of rebellions in the DRC since the 1990s. Congolese Tutsi live in territories in North Kivu and South Kivu near Rwanda and speak Kinyarwanda. The Congolese authorities have often tolerated hate speech against them and at times openly questioned or even revoked their Congolese nationality.4 The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent influx of defeated soldiers and Hutu militiamen into Rwandophone areas of the Kivus worsened the plight of Congolese Tutsis, many of whom fled to Rwanda. Some of those who stayed in the DRC formed armed groups that, with Ugandan and Rwandan backing, fought in the civil and regional wars of the 1990s and early 2000s.

As a result, a core group of aggrieved, battle-hardened figures has long circulated in the Great Lakes region, seeking, and often receiving, sponsorship from the DRC’s neighbours.5 Rwanda in particular has often used proxies to exert influence in the DRC, whose ample mineral resources underpin its own economy. In addition, given the large-scale slaughter of Tutsis in the genocide, Rwanda views the protection of Congolese Tutsis, who are a minority in North Kivu, as its moral duty. It has also made clear that it seeks to eventually repatriate around 80,000 Congolese Tutsi refugees on its territory.6

The eastern DRC has thus seen a succession of armed movements that were ostensibly fighting on behalf of the Tutsi community, with their members also eyeing positions in the army and administration or angling for their own enrichment. Tutsi fighters occasionally joined the Congolese army as part of peace deals, but more often mounted new insurgencies to put pressure on the government. Those in power in Kinshasa have never fully addressed demands for amnesties, army billets or broader issues such as protecting the Tutsis or allowing the wholesale return of Tutsi refugees from camps in Rwanda and Uganda.7 At the same time, dozens of other militias have emerged in the eastern DRC, often to battle Tutsi armed groups they viewed as invading forces.

In 1999, the UN deployed a peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, with a mandate to stem the violence in the eastern DRC and support the government. Though troop numbers have varied over the years, at its peak the mission had some 20,000 blue helmets, some of whom engaged in combat with rebel groups including the M23. As the main protagonists signed peace agreements in the early 2000s, the mission gradually drew down and became more of a holding force to protect civilians. In recent years, it has been subject to increasing criticism from Congolese governments as well as locals as the unrest spread again, spearheaded by the M23’s return.

The [M23]’s roots can be found in a militia led by Congolese warlord Laurent Nkunda, who formed the National Council for the Defense of the People (CNDP in French) in 2006.
The rebel group’s roots can be found in a militia led by Congolese warlord Laurent Nkunda, who formed the National Council for the Defense of the People (CNDP in French) in 2006. When the Congolese government of then-President Joseph Kabila began pushing for CNDP fighters to be integrated into the national army as part of stabilisation plans, Nkunda baulked at the prospect of having to break up his rebellion, fearing that his military and political power might shrink. Talks between Rwanda, the CNDP’s sponsor, and the DRC culminated in an agreement to tackle jointly rebel groups in the east, in particular the Hutu-led Rwandan Democratic Liberation Front (FDLR, by the French acronym) insurgency. Following that deal in January 2009, Rwandan authorities arrested Nkunda, leaving his military chief of staff Bosco Ntaganda to take over the CNDP’s leadership.

On 23 March 2009, the CNDP reached an agreement with the Congolese government to transform into a political party and allow the army to absorb its fighters. The agreement also covered the return from exile, amnesty and reintegration into Congolese institutions of the movement’s leaders. The CNDP participated in elections in 2011, winning one parliamentary seat and several provincial assembly seats. But integration of rebel fighters into the army lagged, for two main reasons. First, Congolese officials and international partners, including the UN, sought to avoid further disrupting the army’s chains of command. Secondly, Kabila’s government had little appetite to follow through on the 2009 agreement, especially after the CNDP’s weak electoral performance. As a result, it never issued the promised amnesties.

Three years later, under strain from internal leadership disputes, former CNDP units formed the M23 insurgency, naming the group after the 23 March 2009 accord. The rebels argued that the government had violated the terms of the agreement and put forward a range of demands, including full integration into the national army on their own terms and with their own ranks, a halt to alleged discrimination against former rebels and the safe return of Congolese Tutsis from refugee camps in Rwanda and Uganda. Unable to draw sizeable support among Congolese Tutsis, but counting on Rwanda’s backing, the M23 seized Goma in December 2012. International pressure on Rwanda, coupled with pushback from the Force Intervention Brigade, a unit with an offensive mandate within the UN peacekeeping mission (and composed of troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania), compelled the rebellion to retreat. A majority of M23 combatants fled to Uganda, while others withdrew to Rwanda with the hope of eventually returning to the DRC.

After taking office in January 2019, President Tshisekedi tried to tackle the myriad armed groups in the eastern DRC by mending relations with his neighbours. He had some success at first, mainly by bringing Rwanda’s Kagame and Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni together under a quadripartite framework facilitated by Angola. Deep-rooted mistrust between Rwanda and Uganda stalled the regional process, however, prompting Tshisekedi to pursue bilateral diplomacy instead. Tshisekedi acceded to Kagame’s call for Rwandan troops to be allowed to fight the FDLR on Congolese soil. He also agreed to consider the M23’s demands, greenlighting talks with the group’s leaders. But the dialogue went nowhere, as the rebels insisted on full amnesty for ex-combatants or integration into the army, while the Congolese government insisted that those guilty of serious crimes face justice. Still, in late 2019, Tshisekedi instructed military prosecutors to rescind arrest warrants for senior M23 figures.8

Tshisekedi’s bilateral efforts to stabilise the east got tangled in the web of power and business interests that has kept the Great Lakes in turmoil for decades.
Over time, Tshisekedi’s bilateral efforts to stabilise the east got tangled in the web of power and business interests that has kept the Great Lakes in turmoil for decades. He struck deals with the Ugandan government that gave Rwanda the impression of being excluded from negotiations over future regional economic and security relations. In November 2021, Kinshasa allowed Kampala to deploy as many as 4,000 soldiers on Congolese soil to fight the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamic State affiliate that Museveni held responsible for a spate of bombings in Uganda’s capital. Uganda used this opportunity to forge ahead with mining projects and road construction in the tri-border area, threatening Rwanda’s access to mineral resources in the DRC. A few months later, presumably with Tshisekedi’s blessing, hundreds of Burundian troops crossed into South Kivu province to hunt down insurgents from RED-Tabara, a rebel group that opposes the regime in Bujumbura and has backing from Rwanda.

Tshisekedi was trying to curb the violence in the east, but the Ugandan and Burundian deployments visibly angered Kagame. In a blistering speech to parliament in early February 2022, Kagame threatened to send troops across the border to contain what he said was a grave threat emanating from the Kivus, citing alleged connections between the ADF and FDLR.9

B.
The M23’s Re-emergence
In late 2021, M23 fighters filtered back into the DRC to set up a base in the tri-border area with Rwanda and Uganda known as Rutshuru territory. Most of the commanders, including the top one, Makenga, came from the M23 cohort that had taken refuge in Uganda when the rebellion disintegrated in 2013.10 In early 2022, and under Makenga, the M23 began capturing strategic areas, attacking villages near the Rwandan and Ugandan frontiers before marching into the town of Bunagana, which straddles the Congolese-Ugandan border. The capture of Bunagana in June 2022 enabled the M23 to strengthen its rear bases and supply routes, with Ugandan border officials reportedly looking the other way. After M23 rebels captured two more towns in October, the Congolese government, angered by what it said were Rwandan troops arriving en masse on Congolese territory, expelled the Rwandan ambassador in Kinshasa, heightening diplomatic tensions.

Despite Kigali’s denials that it was supporting the M23, it soon became clear that the rebels were benefiting from sophisticated planning, as well as arms, recruitment and training, provided by Rwanda.11 In late 2023, the rebels encountered fierce resistance from Congolese soldiers aided by local militias known collectively as the Wazalendo, which temporarily recaptured the town of Kitshanga and slowed the M23’s offensive. According to UN experts, thousands of Rwandan troops poured into the eastern DRC throughout this period, handing the M23 weaponry and uniforms. Today, overwhelming evidence from UN investigations, civil society groups, eyewitness accounts and satellite imagery confirms that the Rwandan military has been directly involved with the M23 since at least 2022.12

Bolstered by military gains, the M23 then declared its political ambitions. In December 2023, the former chief of the Congolese electoral commission, Corneille Nangaa, announced that the M23 was creating a political wing, the AFC. In a press conference in Kenya, Nangaa said the AFC sought to overthrow the government as a means of addressing endemic insecurity and corruption.13 Most observers perceived the AFC’s establishment as an attempt to broaden the rebellion’s support base, given that Nangaa is from Haut-Uélé province in the north east and is not Tutsi. The AFC’s creation also appeared to indicate that regional powers were growing tired of Tshisekedi’s refusal to negotiate with the M23. They hoped that a new political platform could press him to reconsider his stance.14

By early 2024, the M23 began encircling the strategic town of Sake, cutting off key roads and threatening supply lines to Goma.
By early 2024, the M23 began encircling the strategic town of Sake, cutting off key roads and threatening supply lines to Goma, situated some 30km to the east. Aided by Rwandan drones, mortars and other heavy weaponry, rebel fighters captured important terrain, prompting tens of thousands to flee to Goma. The standoff around Sake lasted for months, pitting Rwandan soldiers and the M23, on one hand, against the Congolese military and allied forces, on the other.

Elsewhere, the rebels escalated their campaign by seizing valuable mining assets. For example, in April 2024, they captured the Rubaya mining site, where there is a major reserve of the coltan (columbite-tantalite) used to make smartphones and other electronic devices. This mineral had previously transited various routes, including through Rwanda via Congolese traders, before being shipped to Asia. By taking Rubaya and the roads and tracks that lead from the vast site to the Rwandan border, the M23 acquired full control of the trade, freezing out Congolese intermediaries.15

Following the breakdown of regional diplomacy in December 2024, the M23 and Rwandan army intensified their assault on Sake. As the Congolese army and its allies retreated in disarray, the attackers pressed their advantage. As the following January came to an end, fierce fighting engulfed the outskirts of Goma, involving up to 6,000 Rwandan troops and decisive Rwandan weaponry, especially armed drones and mortars. Thousands of civilians and soldiers died, and hundreds of thousands of people either fled the violence or were forcibly displaced by the M23 and Rwandan troops. Abuses against civilians, mainly displaced people, were widespread, especially sexual and gender-based violence.16 On 27 January, the rebels marched into the city, where most of the MONUSCO peacekeepers have been stationed for decades, opening a new chapter in the region’s turbulent history.17 Within a month, the rebels captured Bukavu, with less fighting this time, consolidating their control of two strategic cities and Lake Kivu, which sits between them and Rwanda.

The Rubaya mine sits in a strategic location allowing the M23 to control trade in critical minerals.
The Rubaya mine sits in a strategic location allowing the M23 to control trade in critical minerals. Source: Satellite imagery analysis by Crisis Group. CRISIS GROUP / Planet Labs
C.
The International Dimension: Mediation and Intervention
Between 2022 and 2024, mediation efforts mandated by the AU struggled. Kigali and Kinshasa remained intransigent on key issues, engaged in hostile rhetoric and wilfully misinterpreted the commitments they had made. Meanwhile, Rwanda’s backing for the M23 was unstinting.

1.
Mediation efforts flounder
Conscious of the impact of spreading fighting on regional stability, the AU named Angola as mediator between Rwanda and the DRC in 2022. Angola has deep knowledge of the DRC: it shares a 2,500km border with the country and was militarily involved in the 1998-2003 civil war. Angolan President Lourenço and a small team of advisers expended considerable effort to extract concessions from the two sides, on one hand urging Kigali to withdraw its troops from Congolese territory and on the other asking Kinshasa to stop collaborating with non-state armed groups and to clamp down on anti-Tutsi hate speech. But while Lourenço had the clout needed to summon the two sides’ leaders for individual talks, he was hard pressed to achieve consensus between them.

From the outset, Rwanda refused to admit that it was part of the fighting. Kigali argued that the crisis was an internal Congolese matter that affected Rwanda only in so far as the violence threatened its borders. For his part, Tshisekedi stuck to the view that the eastern DRC had been invaded by a hostile neighbour and made concessions only haltingly, all the while refusing to speak with the M23. His government repeatedly ordered the army to loosen its ties to the FDLR as a show of good faith. But it failed to enforce these directives when commanders disregarded them.

Still, during ministerial talks in Luanda in July 2024, the DRC and Rwanda agreed to a ceasefire that was to take effect on 4 August.18 The parties also committed to “neutralising” the FDLR and to establishing a tripartite verification mechanism to monitor compliance with the ceasefire. Angola described the truce as indefinite. Both sides were violating the agreement within weeks, however, as clashes resumed in North Kivu, particularly in Rutshuru territory. In December, Kagame cancelled his plans to attend a meeting in Luanda with Tshisekedi. Frustrated with the two sides’ obstinacy, Angola formally ended its mediation role in March 2025, weeks after taking over the rotating AU presidency.

The DRC perceived Kenya as sympathetic to Rwanda given that the [EAC] did not undertake targeted military action against the M23.
Other regional initiatives have faced even greater struggles. In 2022, the East African Community (EAC) deployed a Kenya-led peacekeeping operation with the goals of ending armed group violence in the eastern DRC and supporting humanitarian relief efforts.19 Despite gains on the latter front, the DRC decided not to renew the force’s mandate after twelve months. East African diplomats later claimed that the government sometimes set contradictory aims for the mission.20 For its part, the DRC perceived Kenya as sympathetic to Rwanda given that the force did not undertake targeted military action against the M23. The bloc also named former President Uhuru Kenyatta as its facilitator with the responsibility of pushing for a political settlement in talks with armed group representatives, dubbed the Nairobi process. These talks soon faltered, however, as Kinshasa objected to the M23’s participation in the absence of a working ceasefire.

In late December 2024, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) decided to enter the fray at Kinshasa’s invitation. But it was only the following February, two months after the first SADC soldiers arrived in Goma, that South Africa’s government announced it was deploying 2,900 troops “to assist in the fight against illegal armed groups in the eastern DRC”.21 Malawi and Tanzania were said to have committed about 2,000 troops as well, but little information was made public about the deployment as a whole. Coordination among this force and others in Goma, including the UN, was reportedly difficult and sometimes non-existent.22 In any event, the force was ill-equipped and lacked air support, contributing to the death of fourteen South African soldiers when the M23 captured Goma. SADC officially confirmed the force’s withdrawal from the eastern DRC in April.

2.
Positions and motivations of the M23’s backers
Since 2022, foreign diplomats and mediators working on the Great Lakes file have largely acknowledged that Rwanda backs the M23 and has stationed troops in the eastern DRC to bolster the rebellion. Yet they struggle to grasp Rwanda’s underlying rationale, and views diverge as to whether its actions are the cause or the result of instability in the DRC’s eastern provinces.23 Generally speaking, discussion focuses not on whether the threats Rwanda evokes are real, but on whether they are serious enough to justify its 2021 decision to reactivate the M23 insurgency. These differences have prevented Western and African officials from exerting coordinated, consistent pressure on Rwanda to withdraw from Congolese territory.

All the while, Rwanda has reiterated that it does not support the M23 and that its military intervention is part of what it describes as “defensive measures” to ward off armed groups in the eastern DRC, particularly the FDLR. Kigali is also worried about former government insiders who have tried to muster opposition to the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front from outside the country.24 Furthermore, Rwandan officials claim that Kigali has a moral duty to protect Congolese Tutsis from ethnic persecution, at times even using the word “genocide” to describe the scale of the violence against their kinsmen.

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Source: https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/democratic-republic-congo-rwanda/320-m23-offensive-elusive-peace-great-lakes